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A
D E F E N C E
OF A L A T E
P A M P H L E T , &c.

AS the Remarker does me the Favour to ascribe to Mr. *J.* the Treatise remark'd upon; I shall be so complaisant as, in return, to ascribe *the Remarks* to Mr. *W.* there being, though not his Name, yet his *Symbol*, both in the Motto of the Title-Page, and up and down in the Pamphlet.

He begins, p. 1. *I shall, says he, confine myself to the little of Argument and Reasoning which occurs in it, (the Treatise)----- as it is declar'd to be the last Effort of an expiring Cause.*

If there is little of Argument left, it is entirely owing to Mr. *W.*'s not venturing to defend himself in the numerous Errors and gross Fallacies and Misrepresentations charged upon almost every Part of his Writings. Many things, which he knew he could not defend, he has drop'd, without owning he was convicted of *wrong Reasoning, misunderstanding, and mistranslating* ancient Greek and Latin Authors: And he has, without asking Pardon, passed over in silence several other things which he knew to be mere Calumny and Slander; many Instances of which are shewn in the Treatise upon which the Remarks are made. So that there is really little or nothing left for Mr. *J.* to confute: And I can only just observe the last Struggles of a dying Critic. Mr. *W.* is like an old beaten Gladiator full of Scars, who boasts that every Cut and Wound he has receiv'd, is a Demonstration of his having obtain'd so many Victories: And he much resembles the famous *Falstaff*, who having deserted the Field and run away, boasted how many Enemies he had killed.

The Foundation of Mr. *W.*'s *Divine Legation*, and all his Building upon it, has been shewn to be a mere Romance, and building Castles in the Air: And all his Display upon ancient Learning, Philosophy, My-

Myſteries, Hieroglyphics, &c. has been prov'd to be Revery and Dream ; and he has never had the Luck to underſtand or to reaſon right on any one Point he undertook to illuſtrate. He has taken Liberty to inſult and abuſe ſeveral Men of real Learning, in a manner immodeſt and plainly intolerable, as the moſt ignorant are often the moſt inſolent : And tho' he has nothing to ſay in his own Defence, and has been forc'd to be ſilent in every material Point, all the Modeſty he has ſhewn has been in reſuſing to plead, and then to triumph as if he had got his Cauſe.

As ſoon as you detect him in one falſe Reaſoning or Fact, he leaves you, and runs into many others : Charge him with Miſrepresentation, Prevarication, and Calumny, all the Satisfaction you get is, (inſtead of an ingenuous Confeſſion, and taking a commendable Shame to himſelf) to have a new Load of theſe thrown upon you the next Opportunity. Mr. W. has left the *Divine Legation*, baffled as it is, without any Attempt to ſave it. He has left his Friends to find out for him the *Greek Caſci* ; to make Senſe, if they can, of his *Exoterics* and *Eſoterics* ; to diſcover the *Eleuſinian Myſteries* in *Virgil*, and to celebrate them at *Athens* ; to ſhew for him the fine *Scenery* of *Abraham's* ſacrificing his Son ; and to act the old Drama

Drama of *Job* and his Wife, &c. by a Change of Scenes in *Judæa* and *Babylon*, instead of *Arabia*; to prove the *Egyptian* Hieroglyphics to be elementary, and common Letters of writing: And, to name no more, he leaves it to his *honest Seconds* to defend him in charging Mr. *J.* with downright calumnious Falsities; and in forging for Mr. *J.* whole Sentences and long Paragraphs, of which he wrote not one Word; and at the same time pretending he contradicted himself, and disowned what he had said, when the whole Charge is his own Invention.

In the present Remarks, Mr. *W.* deserts every Part of his Scheme which was considered and confuted by Mr. *J.* and has nothing to say against the Philosophers not believing a future State, which Mr. *J.* might justly say he prov'd to a Demonstration, that they did. All he has left is, to maintain a second-hand critical Remark upon a forg'd Letter of *Plato*; and another on the Book of *Aristotle de Mundo*; and two or three little things besides.

If *Plato* ever spoke the real Sentiments of his Mind about a future State, we must suppose he wou'd declare them in a Letter to his Friends: And that he did so, Mr. *J.* prov'd in *his farther Defence*, p. 38. What does Mr. *W.* reply to this? He does not deny

deny but that *Plato* declar'd fully for a future State ; but he questions whether he deliver'd *his real Opinion*, p. 2. The Reason he gives is, because in another suppos'd Letter, there is mention of a Symbol or Mark (not mention'd in this) whereby *Dionysius*, to whom he is suppos'd to write, was to know when he spake *seriously* concerning the Divine Being, and when not. When he spake according to the vulgar Superstition, he began his Letter with *Gods* in the plural Number ; but when he deliver'd his serious Thoughts of the Divine Being, he wrote *God* in the singular Number ; to shew that he believ'd the *Unity* of God, and thought there was but one Supreme God. Now could Mr. *W.* prove this Letter to be genuine, is it any the least Argument against what Mr. *J.* alledged ? or does it prove, that *Plato* did not write his real Sentiments concerning a *future State* in the Letter undoubtedly genuine, which was cited by Mr. *J.* ? Surely *Plato* might mention *Gods* instead of *God*, when he had a mind to speak popularly ; and might be afraid to speak of the Deity, or God, always in the singular Number, lest the Vulgar should suspect that he believ'd not in their *many Gods* : But he needed not to be afraid of declaring openly his Sentiments of a *future State* of Rewards and Punishments, which was the political and popular Opinion, as well

well as his own. However several Arguments were offer'd to shew this Letter to be counterfeit, and not *Plato's*. *Diogenes Laertius*, from *Thrasylus* or *Thrasyllus*, counted no more than twelve Letters of *Plato*, as was observ'd in the Treatise in Defence of Mr. J. and this makes a thirteenth. And it was probably added to make up the four wrote to *Dionysius*, because one of them had been lost after the Time of *Aristophanes Grammaticus*, and *Thrasyllus*: So that these two very learned and ancient Writers do not appear to have known any thing of this Letter. Nor can it be reasonably suppos'd they did; because they knew that all the four Letters to *Dionysius* were of the *Ethic* kind, as *Diogenes Laertius* tells us from them: whereas this 13th is a Letter of mere *Business*: And Mr. W. our Remarker, owns, that this Letter, which makes up the four to *Dionysius*, is not of the *Ethic* kind. His Words, p. 6. are: *Mr. J. insists, that it does not abound with private and arcane Doctrines, or serious and Ethical Discourses; and who, let me ask him, ever said it did?* Then pray let me ask Mr. W. If this Letter in Debate is not of the *Ethic* kind, or contains *Ethical Discourse*, how can it be one of the four Letters wrote to *Dionysius*, which *Aristophanes Grammaticus*, and *Thrasyllus*, and *Diogenes Laertius* from them, and *Suidas*, say, were of the *Ethic* kind?

kind? The Forger, or whoever put *Plato's* Name to this Letter, is discover'd by the very Mark he has mention'd. For he tells *Dionysius*, all his *serious* Letters began with it; whereas it is not mention'd in one of all *Plato's* Letters which are extant, but this pretended one only, which is not an *Ethic* Letter, but consists of Matters of mere Business and secular Affairs. So if the *Ethic* Letters had the Symbol, those which are extant must all be spurious, as making no mention, or giving any Intimation of it, but this in Debate alone; or else the debated Letter is evidently spurious, as mentioning a Symbol or Mark by which *Plato's Ethic* and serious Letters were to be known, which yet is not found in one of his serious or *Ethic* Letters; and which Mark appears not to have been in any of them, and which also could hardly have been omitted to be mention'd by *Aristophanes Grammaticus* and *Thrasylus*, had they known of any such Symbol. It was observ'd to Mr. *W.* that there were no more than twelve Letters mention'd in *Diogenes Laertius*, and this debated one made thirteen. That to *Perdiccas*, added in *Plato*, is, I think, evidently none of *Plato's*: Whoever can read it (as our Remarker seems not to have done) may easily see it belongs to another Author, in the latter Part of it speaks of *Plato* as a Person who was different from himself

and one of his Friends: And *Serranus* observes, that it was ascribed to *Dion* in some Copies; and rightly judges it to be *Dion's*. The Letter to *Perdiccas* in *Plato* contains Advice to him to use the Counsel of *Euphræus* (a *Platonic*) in his monarchical Administration. Then he adds, *If any one should say that Plato professeth to understand what belongs to and is useful to a popular government, but yet he never in a public Assembly rose and spoke to the People, and advis'd them to take what he thought the best Measures of Government: To this it may be reply'd: That Plato settled late in his Country, and found the People had been long accusom'd by the Counsels of those of former Times to practise many things that were contrary to what he should have advis'd; otherwise he would have been exceeding glad to have consulted with them as his Parent; but that he thought he should bring himself into Danger to no Purpose. And I think* (adds the Letter-Writer) *that my Counsel would be of no better Effect. For if we seem'd irreformable, he (Plato) would bid us Adieu, without giving his Counsel concerning me or my Affairs. Does this look like a Letter wrote by Plato himself? Nothing less; and there is no doubt, I think, but that it was wrote by another Hand, and most probably by Dion. Therefore, if Perdiccas was mention'd by Diogenes Laertius, he could only*
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mean that two of *Plato's* Letters were wrote to *Perdiccas* and the Friends of *Dion*; and the Words, as they stand, imply no more. They are *To Perdiccas*, *To the Friends of Dion*, *two* (Letters) including *Perdiccas* amongst those Friends of *Dion*, to whom two Letters were written, which are found in *Plato*. It is the same Expression as what he says just before, *viz.* *To Hermeas*, *To Erastus and Coriscus*, *one* (Letter) which is also extant. And as no judicious Man can doubt of the Letter to *Perdiccas* being not *Plato's*, so his Name was probably without Thought added in *Diogenes Laertius* by some Copier *, from the wrong Inscription of it in some Copies of *Plato*.

* Επιστολαὶ τρισκαίδεκα ἡδικαί. Πρὸς Ἀριστοδήμον, μία· πρὸς Ἀρχίταν, δύο· πρὸς Διονύσιον, τίτλαρις· πρὸς Ερμείαν, πρὸς Εραστον καὶ Κορίσκον, μία· πρὸς Λιωδάμαστα, μία· πρὸς Δίωνα, μία· πρὸς τὸς Δίωνος οἰκίους, δύο. In all 12, not 13. This was the Division of *Thrasylus* or *Thrasyllus*, who flourish'd in the Reigns of *Augustus* and *Tiberius*: And *Aristophanes Grammaticus* might enumerate the same Number. But whoever can count, must see there are no more than *twelve* Letters. So stands the *Edit. Aldrob. Lond.* 1664. p. 84. The Edition of *Menagius* differs only in the last Particular; and has πρὸς Περδικκαν, πρὸς τὸς Δίωνος οἰκίους, δύο· which implies that there were no more than *two* Letters to *Perdiccas* and the Friends of *Dion*, (otherwise he would have wrote πρὸς Περδικκαν, μία) and so but *twelve* in all. And the Correction δώδεκα for τρισκαίδεκα is right. But it is highly probable that the Name of *Perdiccas* is an Interpolation in one of the Editions of *Diogenes Laertius*; as it is almost certain that the Letter to him in *Plato* is none of *Plato's* Letters.

But the critical Remarker will ask ; if you take away one from *Dionysius*, and that to *Perdiccas*, there will remain no more than eleven Letters : True. But add one to *Dionysius* which is lost, and there will be again *twelve*. Dr. Bentley could prove no more ; and his Arguments for thirteen, and the Genuineness of the thirteenth to *Dionysius*, are very weak, and unworthy of him. *Indignor quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus*. Dr. Bentley saw it was a Letter not of the *Ethic* kind, but of *Business* only ; and some of it too low and trifling for *Plato* to be concern'd in : And this was sufficient to shew it was not *Plato's*, all whose Letters were *Ethic*. There is another Mark which discovers this Letter not to be *Plato's* ; the Letter-Writer in the Beginning reminds *Dionysius*, that at one of his Entertainments a Person who was next to him at Table, when *Dionysius* join'd their Company, told him, *That he had been much improv'd in Wisdom by the Assistance of Plato* *Dionysius* reply'd, *Yes ; and also in many other things ; and that he had been profited by him, from the Time he sent for him*. Then he recommends to *Dionysius*, a Disciple of *Eudoxus* ; which is not very probable that *Plato* would do, there being an Emulation between them. Now does Mr. W. think that *Plato* could write this Letter ? But this it is to be a second-hand Critic.

The serious Reader will be surpriz'd at what follows. Mr. *W.* was charg'd with *setting Mr. Jackson's Hand to what he never wrote*; and to this Purpose he alledg'd a large Passage wrote in *Italics* to distinguish it from his own Words. The Passage is, *viz.* he affirms in the second Edition of the *Critical Enquiry*, p. 173. *That Mr. Jackson has given it under his Hand, that he never offer'd the future Renovation of the Stoics as a Proof that they believ'd another life; but that he confin'd their Notion of a future State to the Period that intervenes between Death and the general Restoration: And that he never mention'd the Refusion of the Soul into the first Cause as a State of Happiness, nor ever consider'd it in that View.* Had Mr. *Jackson* said or thought what is here suggested, and which he is by the Critic suppos'd to retract, he must have been as absurd a Writer as he has prov'd our Critic to be. But as he neither said or thought any such thing, nor has given under his Hand what is here feign'd by the Critic, he was justly charg'd with Forgery, and setting Mr. *Jackson's Hand to what he never wrote.* Our Remarker Mr. *W.* mentions the Charge; and then dropping the Passage above on which it was founded, would have you believe he is quite innocent; and though conscious of the Guilt of Calumny and gross Prevarication, he with a peculiar Effrontery says;

says; *And does he (Mr. J.) expect after this that we ever should appeal to his Candor and Ingenuity again? or that his Complaints of Misrepresentation, Calumny, &c. should be consider'd as any thing more than the constant Refuge of a baffled Zealot*; with a great deal more of the same base Calumny, p. 7. This is a strong Application of his own * Motto to himself, taken from his real Character: And all Mr. W. can hope for is, that what he writes will be read by none but the most blind Bigots; and so, that he may escape that Censure of the Public, and of every honest Reader, that he, above all other public Defamers, most justly deserves. Let me ask him, if he has any Feeling; Did he not *set Mr. Jackson's Hand to what he never wrote?* Will he deny the Passage above cited to be the Critic's writing, feign'd as a Recantation of Mr. Jackson? Is it not a piece of arrant Forgery? He pleads guilty by Silence. What shall we say then to the fresh Calumny by which he endeavours to conceal his Guilt?

What if Mr. Jackson had said, what was added from another Part of the *Critical En-*

* Mr. W.'s Motto is—*Break one Cob-web thro',
He spins the slight self-pleasing Tread anew.
Destroy his Fib, or Sophistry: In vain;
The Creature's at his dirty Work again.*

This is such a Picture of Mr. W. that one would think he had sat for it.

quity,

quiry, to the Passage above mentioned, viz. *That he never undertook to demonstrate that the Philosophers believ'd a future State; and that he had given this under his Hand, which he really has not; will this vindicate his inventing and setting Mr. Jackson's Hand to a large Passage, which he knows Mr. Jackson wrote not one Word of? And then, as if he had not been guilty of this Forgery, his abusing Mr. J. for charging him with it? This may be thought one of the last Struggles of a baffled and dying Adversary; but sure he should quit the Field, and go off with more Decency: Must his very last Words be Abuse and Calumny? But to prove that Mr. Jackson did undertake to demonstrate that the Philosophers believ'd a future State, and afterward deny'd that he had undertaken it; to what Words in his Book does he appeal? To none. Mr. Jackson told him in his farther Defence, p. 13. (in Answer to his insinuating as if he had in his Book frequently used the Expression, demonstrate) that though he might have call'd a strong and irrefragable Proof, which he had given of the Point [of the Philosophers believing a future State] by the Name of Demonstration, which shew'd he did not disclaim the Word or his own Hand, as this Remarker virulently and falsely says; yet he avoided that Word all through his Book on the Point, because Mr. Warburton's Demonstrations had made*

made him sick on't; and wishes he had pointed out the Places where Mr. J. had undertook to demonstrate what Mr. W. says he did. He knew he could not find the Word *demonstrate* applied to the Subject under Debate in the whole Book, though he had suppos'd it frequently there; but finding the Word in the *Title-Page* (which the Printer was order'd by Mr. *Jackson*. himself to take notice of its being put there, but neglected to do so) Mr. *W.* lays hold of this Shadow and wretched Pretence, both of abusing Mr. *J.* as if he had *disclaim'd his own Hand* (though he never deny'd the Word to be in the *Title Page*) and as if he *had affirm'd that the Word was put there by the Author of the Enquiry.* Thus Iniquity abounds: And he hopes by fresh and the most bare-faced Calumny to vindicate what he had really forg'd, and laid to Mr. *Jackson* as his *Hand-writing*. Sure such a Writer will never venture to shew his Face in public any more hereafter. What would the poor Creature do, if he could get a real Occasion of finding fault with Mr. *Jackson*? But Mr. *J.* is secure against all his feeble and dirty *Cob-web* Attacks, both from his own Character, and from the Character of his Opponent, whom to find once to reason or write like a Scholar would be so extraordinary, as not easily to be forgotten. But we shall find him at
his

his dirty forging Work again, before we have done.

Next, p. 6, 7, 8, he talks very impertinently he knows not what, about *Andronicus Rhodius's* Paraphrase upon the *Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*. Had he but consulted the Preface to the *Cambridge Edition*, though he had gone no farther, he would have seen what ancient Evidence there is to believe that *Andronicus Rhodius*, the famous *Peripatetic* Teacher was the Author of it. What has Mr. *W.* to alledge against him? This great Dealer in second-hand Citations has got none but negative or dumb Evidence. A MS. of this Book, says Dr. *Bentley*, has no Name of an Author to it; and in Daniel Heinsius's Copy, *Andronicus's Name was added by a modern and unlearned Hand*. Therefore, concludes our modern improv'd Critic, *Andronicus Rhodius* was not the Author of the Paraphrase; though yet he is the ancient Claimant and Possessor of it, and none but our Critic's Non-Entities have ever disputed it. Mind his Argument, for 'tis a special one.

Andronicus's Name (as he cannot deny) has been fix'd to this Book for many Centuries. Old MSS. own him; and ancient Writers speak of his being a Commentator on *Aristotle's Works*: But some MSS. have

omitted his Name, without adding any other; therefore *Andronicus* was not the Author: And Mr. J. may be ashamed for asserting he was, now he is told of it by our improv'd second-hand Critic. However, I confess I have the *Pleasure* always to get something by our Critic's improv'd Way of reasoning. Here is a new Rule of Criticism, by which you destroy any *positive* Evidence by a mere negative or silent one, drawn *ex ignorantia facti*. One gives positive Evidence to a fact, another knows nothing of the Matter; therefore the positive Evidence is disprov'd and set aside by the Evidence which knows nothing of it. Mr. J. might take a little Pleasure in an Adversary who is a Critic of this Cast, if it was not balanced by a just Indignation at so deprav'd a Taste. And after all, whether *Andronicus* was the Author of the Paraphrase or not, yet all, who have any Taste, agree that it is a just and true Interpretation of the *Aristotelian* Opinions; for which Purpose Mr. J. cited it to shew, *ex abundanti*, that *Aristotle* taught and believ'd a future State.

Our Remarker is so able a Critic (p. 8---13.) as to imagine that because *Stobæus*, *Justin the Martyr*, and others, cite Greek Passages as containing the Doctrines of *Hermes Trismegistus*, they believ'd these Passages to have been wrote by this old *Egyptian* Philosopher.

losopher. I'll warrant you they were such Fools as to think that *Hermes*, call'd *Trismegistus*, the oldest *Egyptian* Philosopher and Legislator, wrote the *Greek* Books which go under his Name, many Centuries before *Cadmus* carried Letters into *Greece*; and that an *Egyptian* too wrote his Philosophy in *Greek* without understanding a Word of the Language. I own this would destroy their Credit as old Critics; and they must be ranked amongst our modern improved ones. But what if they thought no more than that the *Greek* Books under his Name contain'd only an Account of his Doctrine. This is consistent with being a Critic, is it not? And let Mr. *W.* or any modern Critic disprove it; or shew, if he can, that they believ'd such an Absurdity, as that the Books which go under the Name of *Hermes Trismegistus* were really genuine, and written by the Man whose Name they bear, (p. 8.)

As to *Apuleius*, his Skill in the *Greek* and *Latin* Language is so well known and attested, that it would be no Discredit to Mr. *W.* to have but a Taste of his Learning that way. So that he, and *Stobæus*, and *Justin*, that pious Christian Martyr, [against whose Testimonies for *Aristotle* writing the Book *de Mundo* our Critic has nothing to alledge] will maintain the Credit of their positive Evidence against the negative Evidence of an

hundred such modern Critics, as *Heinsius*, *Salmasius*, and *Gassendus*, who are certainly but very moderate Critics; though the *Scaligers* and *J. Casaubon* were really Critics. But what have these last done in the Point debated, which is the Genuineness of the Book *de Mundo* ascrib'd to *Aristotle*? Have they given any Evidence from old MSS. ascribing this Book to any other Author but *Aristotle*? Have they discover'd any Fact in the Book inconsistent in Chronology with the Time of *Aristotle*? or have they shewn that the Stile is different from *Aristotle's*, or the Notions in it contrary to his Doctrine? These are the Ways by which to judge about the Genuineness of ancient Books; And if Mr. *W.* could do any thing this way, it would be to the Purpose. But as they have not produced any Evidence of this or any kind sufficient to prove the Book not *Aristotle's*; what signifies their bare Opinion or Judgment against such Evidence as that of *Demetrius*, *Justin Martyr*, *Apuleius*, and *Stobæus*: from which it appears, that the Book was ascrib'd to *Aristotle* in their Times; and that the MSS. above two thousand Years ago entitled it to *Aristotle*? An old Critic would take this for a fair and rational Evidence, and a sufficient Proof in the Case; though a modern improv'd Critic has no Notion of this sort of Evidence. The mere Imagination of a modern Critic is superior to
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it all : And had Mr. *J.* been aware of this, he might *ad hominem* have poll'd modern Critics with him, if the best ancient Evidence was to be set aside.

Mr. *W.* thought he could deal with *Justin Martyr*, *Apuleius*, and *Stobæus*, and invalidate their Evidence, by calling them Names ; for that was all : And in his Remarks, the Charge against them is, as I have shewn, really ridiculous and absurd. But as he owns, he had a better Opinion of *Demetrius*, and allows him to be a far abler Critic than any of the other three, (p, 14.) he took no notice of his Evidence, but drop'd it out of pure Respect to him, as it seems, and did not care he should appear in such unworthy Company.

The Reason our honest Remarker gives for dropping the Testimony of so able a Critic and Judge in the Case as *Demetrius*, is perhaps as extraordinary as ever was offer'd. Mr. *J.* produced four ancient Testimonies (not minding Moderns) against Mr. *W.*'s six Moderns ; he abuses three of them by hard and invidious Names, instead of reasoning against the Validity of their Evidence : And having thus confuted their Evidence like a modern improv'd Critic, he refuses to hear the Testimony of *Demetrius*, the fourth Witness, and will not suffer him to appear in Court, and give his Evidence. His Reason
is,

is, *because he thought him a far abler Critic than any of the other three---which* (he adds) *may serve to shew that his bare Authority is not sufficient to fix and determine the Point in question.* If this be not *Demonstration*, I know not what is; and I have nothing to say against it but this: Let me ask our Remarker, not as a Critic but *as a mere Answerer by Profession*, whether it was ever judg'd either *Law* or *Equity*, to set by the Evidence of one and the most material Witness in a Cause, because the Evidence of three others cited in the Case was not so strong or material as his? This one Evidence is sufficient in the Case to over-balance all his *most consummate Critics that ever liv'd*, and an hundred more such. He was one perfectly well skill'd, and a Critic in *Greek Learning*, far beyond what any Modern can pretend to; and had infinitely better Opportunity of knowing the genuine Writings of *Aristotle*, than any modern Critic can have. And as, no doubt, he found the Book was ascrib'd to *Aristotle*; and as no later Evidence from MSS. has been or can be alledg'd against its Genuineness, it is in vain to contest it. Our Remarker therefore had better have let the Book *de Mundo* alone, and the Passage cited from it; neither of which Mr. J. laid any stress upon, as he must know: But he wanted to show his critical Talent at second-hand, and what has he got by it?

To dispute whether the Philosophers believ'd a future State, is next to disputing whether any Christian ever believ'd it. Our Remarker talks very confusedly about the *Pythagoric* Migration, which only related to the future State of wicked Souls, which were suppos'd to pass into the Bodies of such Persons as resembled their Tempers and Dispositions, for a Punishment of their Crimes in this Life, and in order to a future Reformation: This brutal State was always taught to be by Divine Appointment; or by the Law of Divine Providence; which is what is meant by the *Physical Necessity*; not a Necessity of Nature independent of God's Will; but a Necessity originally founded in and arising from the Divine *Moral* Government of the World: By which Constitution virtuous and pious Men were happy and rewarded, and vicious and impious Men were punished and made miserable hereafter. This *Plato* treats of at large in his *Timæus*: And nothing is plainer, if Mr. *W.* understood what he calls the *Philosophy of Language*, or the Language of the ancient Philosophers.

But Mr. *J.* is at last so happy as to have Mr. *W.* after all he has said of the Philosophers not believing a future State, own that they actually held and believ'd it. This he had own'd in general before, having said
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in the Appendix to his second Vol. p. 13. *That he had all along affirm'd, the Philosophers both in their external and internal Teaching held a future State* : He will own too, that they held a future State of *Happiness and Misery*. Now who but an old Critic will pretend that this Confession is inconsistent with his *Demonstrations*, that the Philosophers neither did nor could believe a future State ? But it is no such thing as an Inconsistency. His *Demonstrations*, notwithstanding this Concession, are as good as ever, that the Philosophers neither did or could believe a future State. This will appear presently, and the Reader must be prepar'd for it. Mr. *W.* agrees with respect to the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, that the first believ'd the rational or intelligent Soul was to subsist in a future State, and that this is *the very thing he had affirm'd* (p. 20.) but then he insists (p. 23.) *this future State was not a future State of Happiness or Misery appointed by God as a proper Reward or Punishment*. This he proves, because the Punishment of wicked Men, how great soever, was only suppos'd to be a Migration from one Body to another by a *Necessity merely physical* (p. 20.) and he drops the Consideration of the Happiness of righteous Men. Was that by a Migration into the Body of Brutes, thinks he, and by a *mere physical Necessity* ? Did not the *Pythagoreans* believe

lieve that the Souls of good Men, after Death, went to Heaven, and led an immortal, happy, and celestial Life? But Mr. *W.* from his great Skill in *philosophic* Language, fancies to himself a *physical Necessity* which was not appointed by God, but independent of him. He has often talk'd of this Necessity, but so very absurdly, that Mr. *Y.* thought it not worth taking notice of. To talk of physical Necessity as independent and exclusive of Divine Appointment or Providence, is certainly the most unphilosophical Language in the World; and is mere *Epicurean* Language. Does Mr. *W.* think that the *Pythagoreans* believ'd, that at Death the human Soul went into the Body of a brute Animal by a mere natural Necessity, without any Divine Appointment? Certainly, in the mere abstract Nature of Things, there is no more Necessity for the Soul at Death to go into the Body of a Brute, than into a Tree or Flower.

Therefore, as absolute or mere physical Necessity, without the Divine Will and Appointment, could not possibly be the Cause of any such Migration; what these Philosophers meant by physical Necessity, was not a Necessity of Nature independent of Divine Appointment, but a Necessity independent only of the human Soul, and re-
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specting

pecting that Nature of Things which was originally appointed by God, and founded in his moral Government of the World ; by which Constitution virtuous Men were made happy, and vicious Men miserable hereafter. This was appointed by God (as the Philosophers unanimously believ'd, and in particular the *Pythagoreans*, as *Plato* shews in his *Timæus*, p. 42. *Serran. Edit. &c.*) to be the natural Reward of Virtue and Piety on one hand, and the natural Punishment of Vice and Impiety on the other hand. Thus Virtue was its own Reward, and Vice its own Punishment both here and hereafter, but still by the Appointment of God, and by the moral Laws of his Providence. So that Mr. *W.* need not give Mr. *J.* any trouble to prove so plain a thing. The Belief of a God, a Providence, and a future State of Rewards and Punishments, or Happiness and Misery, were immediately and necessarily connected.

Our Remarker, as to *Plato*, is more full and express ; he says, *the Author of the Divine Legation contends, that Plato not only believ'd the future Existence of the Soul, but that he likewise assign'd it this Existence in a State of Happiness or Misery, which were imagin'd to arise from the very Nature and Constitution of Things* (p. 20.) I begin to
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have

have a better Opinion of the Author of the *Divine Legation*, if he really and seriously contends for this Doctrine of a future State being the Belief of *Plato*. It is owning enough for Mr. *J.* or any other reasonable Person, though it seems to clash with his Demonstrations, that the Philosophers, and amongst them *Plato*, neither did or could believe a future State (to which we may add, to please Mr. *W.*) of *Rewards and Punishments*. I hope this is given up as to *Plato* and his Followers. For what is the Happiness attending Virtue in the future State, but the *Reward* of it? And what is the Misery attending Vice in the future State, but the *Punishment* of it? And what is the *Nature and Constitution of Things*, but that Nature and Constitution which is given them by Divine Appointment and the Power and Will of God? Does our Remarker think this future State of Happiness and Misery was suppos'd by *Plato* to arise from the original blind and confus'd Chaos, or from that Nature and Constitution of Things which God ordained and appointed when he created the several Powers with which they are invested, and which are subject to his moral Government? It is better to suppose *Plato* did not believe a future State of Happiness and Misery at all, than to suppose he believ'd it to arise from an impossible Fiction, or a physical

steal Necessity independent of the Power, Will, and Appointment of God, from whose Power and Will he taught and believ'd it only to arise.

P. 21. Mr. *W.* has the Pleasure to find, that Mr. *J.* *both contradicts and confutes himself in the most plain and open manner.* For Mr. Jackson had said, *the Platonists distinguish'd between the sensitive and intelligent Soul, and that the first was material, and suppos'd to die with the Body:* Then complimenting *the Treatise on Criticism* with Mr. *J.*'s Name, he adds; *that he assures us that Plato gave and assign'd the sensitive or animal Soul the very same Immortality with the rational or intelligent.* He did well to cite the Words as follow, *viz.* " *Plato* not conceiv-
 " ing the intelligent Soul or Mind to exist
 " without a *Soul*, as its Vehicle in which it
 " resided, made in consequence this Soul
 " to be immortal." This our acute Critic calls a Contradiction; and if he can shew it to be so, I will allow him to be a *Demonstrator* indeed. Where did Mr. *J.* say, the sensitive or animal ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) Soul was *immortal*, or that *Plato* made it so? If there be any Contradiction, 'tis *Plato's*, not Mr. *J.*'s. But *Plato* is a consistent Writer, whatever becomes of Mr. *W.* *Plato* asserts the intelligent Soul or Mind to be *immortal*; and
Plato

Plato also suppos'd it to reside inseparably in a Soul as its Vehicle, which Soul in consequence he made immortal. The same *Plato* likewise says, that the sensitive or animal Soul (which was *material*) was *mortal*; How shall this acute Critic be made to see that *Plato* has not contradicted himself? It is certainly very dangerous to charge such an Author as *Plato* with *contradicting and confuting himself in the most plain and open manner*. But the plain thing is; *Plato* held the intelligent Mind, or rational Soul, to reside in a Soul which was placed in the superior Part of the Body, *the Head*: He also held another Soul of a distinct Species, which was merely sensitive or animal, and was placed in the human *Breast*: This latter was the Subject of the *Appetites and Passions*, and was *mortal*; but the first was the Habitation of the intelligent Mind, and was *immortal*. So there is an end of his Contradiction, arising merely from Ignorance, and not understanding the plain and express Sense of *Plato*: And his Reflection, which never fails when he weakly thinks he has got an Advantage, vanishes with it. Concerning the two Souls, one *immortal*, the other *mortal*, which *Plato* held, I will set his Words in the * Margin, for the Confusion once more of Mr. *W*.

What

* *Plato*, speaking of the created Gods, says: Οἱ δὲ μισροὶ, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς θανάτου, τὸ μὲν τούτο, δηλοῦσάμα ἐνέει

What follows next relating to the future State of *Aristotle* and his Followers, with the *Stoics*, is more strange. *Mr. W.* takes upon him to affirm, that according to *Aristotle*, the Soul, upon its Separation from the Body, was to be resolv'd into the universal Substance, or God: And that this Refusion was suppos'd to take away and destroy all personal and distinct Existence (p. 21.) The same Account he gives of the *Stoical* future State, p. 23. This indeed, if admitted, will put an end to *Mr. J.*'s Distinction between the rational and sensitive, the immortal and mortal Soul; and it will not be worth while to insist upon it.

But does *Mr. W.* think the learned World will be thus trifled with, and have that call'd a future State (of Happiness and Misery, as

αὐτοὶ περιέλευσαν ὅχημά τι ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα ἰδοσαν "ΑΛΛΟ ΤΙ ΕΙΔΟΣ ἢ αὐτῇ ψυχῇ προσηγορευμένῳ ΘΝΗΤΟΝ, διὰ καὶ ἀναίκατα ἢ αὐτῷ παθήματα ἔχον.—Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ σφόδρα μάλιστα τὸ θεῖον—χωρὶς ἑκείνης καλοῦντιζουσιν—ἢ δὲ τοῖς γήθεσι καὶ τῷ καλεσμένῳ ὄντα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ΘΝΗΤΟΝ γένος ἰνίδαν. *Timæ*, p. 69. *Serran.* Here you see *Plato's* Distinction of the immortal (ψυχῇ) Soul from the mortal (ψυχῇ) Soul; and that he calls the latter a different Species of Soul, which was placed in a different Part of the Body from the immortal Soul, in which dwelt the Mind, called the *Divine Part*. He adds, p. 70. that the rational Soul was placed in the *Head*, call'd ἀκρόπολις; and this he had said before. So that *Mr. J.*'s Distinction between the ῥῆς and ψυχῇ, or the immortal intelligent, and sensitive mortal Soul, is not vain, as *Mr. W.* imagines; but sets the ancient Philosophy in a better Light than he was aware of.

it was always declar'd to be) where *all personal and distinct Existence is destroy'd*? Or can that be call'd the future State of a *Person* where all *personal* Existence is destroy'd? In the first Place, the Return of the Soul at Death to its congenial Element, was not, in the Opinion of any Philosophers, the Refusion of it into the Substance of God, nor by any Reason can ever be prov'd to be so; nor do I believe one Instance can be produced from any ancient Philosopher for such an Opinion. But the Return at Death was a State of personal Existence, happy or miserable, which the *Stoics* held to be temporary, and to precede the Refusion; and the *Platonists* and *Aristotelians* held to be eternal. This was prov'd by Mr. J. with unquestionable Evidence. And suppose it be said, that at Death the human Soul, according to the Christian Doctrine, returns to other Spirits congenial or consubstantial with it, will this prove, or be thought to affirm, that it loses its personal Existence?

Secondly; he must either recant his having said, that *he had all along affirm'd the Philosophers, both in their external and internal Teaching, held a future State*; or I must be so free as to tell him, that to call that a *future State*, where all personal Existence is extinct and destroy'd, is arrant Nonsense: And a Man who can talk at this rate, must either

either never have read an ancient Book of Philosophy in his Life, with the least Taste or Judgment, or else must obstinately and wilfully shut his Eyes against Truth. The Distinction therefore of the rational and sensitive Soul holds good with respect to the *Aristotelians* and *Stoics*, as well as to the *Platonists*; and proves, that though they held the sensitive and animal Soul to die with the Body, yet that they thought the rational Soul subsisted after Death in a State of Happiness or Misery. I should be glad to see one Instance produced from any one of all the Tribes of Philosophers, who ever said, that the Soul at Death was refus'd or dissolv'd into the Substance of God, or suppos'd its personal Existence to be destroy'd. If then it subsisted after Death, and had a personal Existence, this was properly a future State: And *Aristotle* and the *Stoics* taught and believ'd this as much as the *Pythagoreans* and *Plato* did: And Mr. *W.* has been all along deceiving himself in his grand Principle, that the Philosophers, others besides the *Stoics*, neither did or could believe a future State.

P. 23, 24. Mr. *W.* would have us think, that the future State, of *Happiness* was indeed (which Absurdity Mr. *J.* had charg'd him with affirming) a *Fiction of the Philosophers*; but that the future State of *Misery* was

was invented by the more early Lawgivers : And thus he hopes to save himself from *Contradiction*, which he was charg'd with. To clear himself, he alledges (p. 24.) *that what he had advanced concerning the Fiction of the more early Lawgivers, related only to future Punishments, or to the popular Account of the infernal Torments. And what is this (he adds) to the State of Happiness in Heaven?* But I'll shew him, that he suppos'd the State of Happiness in Heaven, as well as the other State of Misery, to be also the receiv'd political and popular Account and Opinion; and consequently, by his own Reasoning, not the Fiction of the *Philosophers*, but of the more early Lawgivers. In the *Critical Enquiry*, p. 22. speaking of the *Caschi*, or ancient Inhabitants of *Italy*, he says; " They thought that Men of great
 " and singular Qualifications, that Persons
 " famous and excellent in their Generations,
 " would be rais'd and exalted *into Heaven*;
 " while all the rest were left to grovel in the
 " World below." *But now (he adds) is not this here represented as a popular and common Notion?----as it certainly is.* If this future State of Happiness in Heaven, and of Misery in the World below, was all the Invention of the Philosophers, then the more early Legislators did not invent either the State of Happiness or of Misery; and Mr. *W.* contradicts himself this Way. If it was

all the Invention of the more early Law-givers, (as by his Reasoning it was) then the Philosophers did not invent the future State of Happiness in Heaven, and he is still involv'd in a Contradiction. But what an Absurdity is it to make the future State a Fiction either of the Philosophers or Legislators? And it is no less Absurdity to suppose the Philosophers invented the future State of Happiness long after the Legislators had invented the future State of Misery. Does our learned Critic think, that the future State was invented by Degrees; first a State of Misery and Torment, and afterward a State of Happiness and Pleasure? Was there ever a Time when both were not believ'd together? And were they not both the constant Belief of all Nations and People at all Times from the Beginning?

I thought Mr. *W.* would have meddled no more with the *Casci*, at least till he had shew'd us to what Part of *Greece* they rambled and settled in, for he pursued them thither. But, p. 25. they must be *Barbarians*, because they liv'd in the Country, and led a plain unpolish'd Country Life; and were *somewhat ignorant* (as *Jerome* relates of them) *of Literature. Apud quos erat cruda rusticitas, et qui humanitatem quodam modo nesciebant.* This Account is no Discredit to them.
But

But how comes Mr. *W.* to make *Jerome* the only Judge of their Character, in opposition to what Mr. *J.* alledg'd from *Cicero*, who knew more of these *old Sages* than *Jerome* can be suppos'd to have done; though *Jerome's* Account is far from making them *a barbarous and rude Rabble*. But the learned Mr. *W.* according to his known Skill in *Greek* and *Latin*, draws his Argument of their *Barbarity* from *Jerome's* Expression, *Humanitatem quodam modo nesciebant*. He durst not construe the Words, for fear of being laugh'd at. He takes *Humanitas* to mean what we call *Humanity*: And so *Jerome* must say, the *Casci* were *in some measure without Humanity*; consequently *a barbarous Rabble*. But take *Humanitas* to mean, as it does, *Erudition* or *Literature* *, what Disparagement was it to those old Religionists, that they were not endued with the *Literature* of After-Ages? And is it not hard to call a Set of worthy, sensible, and honest Men, *a rude Rabble of Barbarians*, and as it were void of *Humanity*, be-

* In this Sense it was used by *Varro* and *Cicero*, whom *Jerome* delighted to imitate. Hear what *A. Gellius* says: *Qui verba Latina fecerunt, quique his probe usi sunt, humanitatem non id esse voluerunt quod vulgus existimat, quodque a Græcis φιλοσοφία dicitur—sed humanitatem appellaverunt id prope modum quod Græci παιδείαν vocant, nos eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artis dicimus:—Sic igitur eo verbo veteres esse usos & cumprimis M. Varronem, Marcumque Tullium omnes ferme libri declarant.* Noët. Att. lib. 13. c. 16.

cause they believ'd a future State, and were not so polite, and of such Gentleman-like Behaviour, or had so much critical Learning as Mr. *W.*?

Mr. *W.* p. 26. is at his old Tricks again. He has not a Syllable to say against Mr. *J.* unless you allow him first to misrepresent him. Here he says; *Mr. J. affirms, that the Philosophers did not suppose the Anima Mundi to be a real and proper God.* And adds; *Why does he make no Reply to what has been alledg'd in support of the contrary Opinion from Varro, &c.?* *Why does he take no notice of the several Testimonies produced, in which the Divinity of the Anima Mundi is inculcated in the most plain and express Terms?* Now would you think that Mr. *J.* does not affirm one Syllable of what he is here charg'd with in the Piece which Mr. *W.* is pleas'd to refer to and ascribe to him? The Words of the Author of the *Treatise on Criticism*, referred to by Mr. *W.* are, viz. *Some Platonics made the Soul a Part of the Mixture or Mixture, out of which the Soul of the World was made, which was (N. B.) always suppos'd to be of a Divine Nature: But then Plato makes this Soul of the World to be created too.* You see the suppos'd Mr. *J.* says, that the Soul of the World was always suppos'd to be of a Divine Nature, (p. 27.) This, it seems, by a Rule of modern Criticism,